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NOTES AND COMMENT

not 'only during one instant personnel but throughout the history of
law in Wisconsin.
The'rule providing for the inclusion of personal property can in no
wise affect the situation, except possibly to urge the imperativeness of
a change to the rule against remoteness of vesting. Now, the rule
must either be against suspension of alienation as to both real and personal property, or against remoteness of vesting as to both. Both are
included in the same section of the statutes and logic alone suffices to
establish this conclusion.
Will of Smith,' 4 decided in 1922, would seem to dispel any thought
of Wisconsin being influenced, at least immediately, by Matter of Wilco.r. Here the court, again inferentially, declared that the policy of the
state was against suspension of alienation only and supported itself by
the decisions noted previously.
However, even supreme courts are not endowed with the aura of infallibility. The New York court reversed itself (but as to real and
personal property alike) and as the better reasoning seems to lie with
Justice Cassoday's dissent in Becker v. Chester, supra, it would not be
surprising to see the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reverse its stand
when the proper case is presented. The amendment to section 230.14
which included personal property in the "perpetuity" statute should
act more or less as a wedge in presenting the opposite view for the
court's perusal. However, in the absence of additional legislation, it
seems that whatever stand is taken, the rule will have to be applied
both to real and to personal property alike.
J. O'B.
Criminal Law: Remarks of District Attorney in final plea as prejudicial error.-In the instant case 1 the defendant, a barber in the city
of Superior, was indicted for taking indecent liberties with little girls
lured into his shop by promises of candy and small amounts of money.
The district attorney in final argument to the jury made two statements
which are the basis for this appeal to the Supreme Court: "The defendant is sending little girls down the primrose path to hell, oustide
of the indecent liberties involved in this case"; and "Defendant's counsel
has said that there was another way of handling this case, and I say the
only other way was to kill him."
The Supreme Court in its review of the case speaks of the general
rule as follows:
Considerable latitude must be permitted in oral argument, and much is left to
the discretion of the trial judge to determine whether an improper statement was
made under such circumstances that it might be excused, mitigated, or even jus-

tified.
However in this case, the remarks as quoted were held to be prejudicial error, notwithstanding the fact that the trial judge directed the
jury to disregard them. In Justice Stevens' opinion we find:
The district attorney represents the commonwealth, a commonwealth which
seeks justice only. It is as much the duty of the district attorney to see that no
" 76 Wis. 494, 186 N. W. 18o.
'O'Neil v. State, 207 N. W. (Wis.) 280.
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innocent man suffers as it is to see that no guilty man escapes. The defendant was
entitled to a trial upon the evidence produced, unaffected by statements of extrinsic
fact or extraneous considerations, such as those presented by the statements of the
district attorney, to which objection was made. District attorneys are charged with
the duty of vigorously prosecuting those who are guilty of crime. Zeal in the
prosecution of offenders is always to be commended. The zeal and fidelity with
which they perform their duties will determine in a large measure the degree of
protection which organized society gives to its individual members. But the district attorney who permits his zeal to secure convictions, causing him to disregard
his duty "as a sworn minister of justice," not only wrongs the defendant, he impedes the administration of criminal justice, and brings the administration of criminal law into disrepute.
In Sullivan v. Catlin,2 cited in the case under comment, the Supreme
Court held, that the trial court must call counsel to order at the outset,
and the mere sustaining of objections without fitting rebuke is no
adequate remedy for the evil, as the rule is that the rights of the defendant may be protected by a prompt, vigorous, and sharp reprimand
of the trial judge, coupled with instruction to the jury to disregard the
prejudicial error.
In reviewing the cases the rule in regard to this matter is stated in
varying degrees. In Fertig v. State3 we find:
So long as the district attorney keeps within the record, the field allowed for
argument is broad and it is not reversible error for him to assume the truth of
the state's evidence, and reasoning from that to say with the utmost freedom what
it tends to prove, and that it convinces him and should convince the jurors as well,
of the guilt of the accused, or even to charge, in express terms, that the accused
is guilty.
4

The rule is slightly modified in Hofer v. State:

The expression by the state's attorney of personal conviction of the guilt of the
accused, as established by the evidence, though not to be commended, is held not to
be reversible error.
And in Meyers v. State,5 a prosecution where the evidence indicated a
very brutal murder by the defendant of his wife, it was held not to
be prejudicial error for the district attorney to characterize in these
words: ". . . . these isn't any of the crimes the Huns have committed
any more atrocious than the crime this man committed." In the review
by the Supreme Court, Justice Vinje writes:
Exception is taken to the language by the defendant on the ground that it asserts
him not only guilty, but to be guilty of a most heinous crime. The jury will understand that the district attorney's declaration of guilt was based upon the evidence
before them, and they were instructed by the court that if they found him guilty,
such finding must be based upon the evidence. Whether or not the district attorney
107 Wis. 291; 124 N. W. 295.
100 Wis. 301; 75 N. W. 96o.
'130 Wis. 576; Iio N. W. 391.
1I76 Wis. 184; 185 N. W. 52o.
2
3
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properly characterized the nature of the crime committed by the defendant, if
guilty, is a matter upon which the judgment of men may well differ.
It appears that the holdings of the instant case and that of the
Meyers case clash to some degree. It is true that the statement, "the
only other way to handle this matter was to kill him," is sensational,
but likewise is the statement about the crimes of the Huns. Such
statement coupled with a direct accusation of the defendant, alleging
defendant's guilt, would seem, under the rule of the O'Neil case, to be
prejudicial error. It appears that the Supreme Court, in the instant
case, is taking a precautionary measure to keep the zeal of the district
attorney within bounds, and is seeking to impress upon the minds of
those officers that the zeal for justice, rather than the zeal for conviction, should actuate their conduct throughout criminal prosecutions
and particularly in their closing arguments to the jury.
LAWSON ADAMS
Jury-Impairment of right-Provision for determination of necessity for taking private property held unconstitutional.-A procedure
which has been consistently followed in condemnation proceedings by
the City of Milwaukee for eighty-seven years was given its death blow
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in granting a writ of prohibition in
the case of State ex rel. Allis v. Wiesner et al.1 The bone of contention
was the determination of the question of necessity in the exercise by
the municipality of the power of eminent domain. At common law this
was, and in several states still is, considered a question for the legislature2 and the usual method was by the appointment of a commission
or similar inquisitorial body. Under the Village Charter 3 granted by
the Territorial Legislature in 1838 the determination of necessity was
left with the Village Board of Trustees. By the City Charter 4 granted
by the Territorial Legislature in 1846 this question was left to the
Common Council. Consequently it is not surprising to note that in the
first draft of the Wisconsin Constitution in 1846 no mention was made
of the determination of the question of necessity in condemnation proceedings. However, an amendment 5 was offered which was adopted
and became section 2 of Article XI of the Wisconsin Constitution. It
reads: "No municipal corporation shall take private property for public
use, against the consent of the owner, without the necessity thereof
being first established by the verdict of a jury." During the argument
upon the amendment no doubt was left as to the end desired. The whole
object of it was to restrain municipal corporations from taking property
at their discretion as they had done theretofore.
In attempted compliance with the Constitution the City Charter
granted by the State Legislature in 1852 provided for the appointment
1 187 Wis- 384, 2o4 N. W. 589.
'Eminent Domain, 2o C. J. 624, State ex ret Baltzel v. Stewart 74 Wis. 620
(629), 43 N. W. 947, 6 L.RtA. 394, Wisco'nsh; Water Co. v. Wilnas, 85 Wis. 26
(39), 54 N. W. 1003, 39 Am.S.R. 813, 2o L.R.A. 662.

' Sec. 8, Act 56 Territorial Legislature passed Jan. 18, 1838.
'Act to Incorporate the City of Milwaukee, passed Jan 3!, 1846.
'Journal of Constitutional Convention, 1848, p. 478.

